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The Uruguay  Round marks the eighth time  countries.  In  many  industrial  countries,  the
since the end of World War II that the mem-  main  objective  of  agricultural  policies  has
ber countries of General Agreement on Tariffs  been  to  stabilize  and  increase  farmers'  in-
and Trade  (GATT) have attempted  to negoti-  come.  In countries  that experienced  wartime
ate  a reduction  in trade restrictions  and pro-  shortages,  these income goals have been  sup-
tection.  Previous  rounds  of negotiation  have  plemented  with  a  drive  to  achieve  self-
had remarkable success in reducing trade pro-  sufficiency  in  food  production.  Support  of
tection.  Average  tariffs  in  major  industrial  farmers'  incomes  and  the  efforts  to  achieve
countries  have  been  reduced  from  about  40  self-sufficiency have contributed to rapid tech-
percent in the 1940s to less than five percent  nological change, higher growth in production,
after  the  Tokyo  Round  which  concluded  in  and accumulation  of large  stocks.  Now many
1979.  This  reduction  in  import barriers  has  industrial  countries are searching  for policies
been  a key factor  in  the ninefold increase  in  that  would  counteract  excessive  production
world trade and the fourfold increase in world  and  would  reduce  the  enormous  budgetary
GNP  in real terms since  1950.  subsidies  to farmers  while  maintaining  farm
Although  the  developing  countries  have  incomes  and  rural  economies  at  politically
gained  from previous  rounds,  in  most cases,  acceptable levels.
those  gains  have  been  limited.  Agriculture,  In many developing countries, the stated ob-
one of the most important sectors for develop-  jectives of agricultural policy in terms of rural
ing countries in terms of employment, export  incomes and self-sufficiency are similar to those
earnings, and income, has been kept outside of  of many  industrial  countries.  The  actual  out-
this negotiating process. The Uruguay Round,  come  of  their  policies  however  has  been
by  proposing  to  extend  the  GATT's  reach  dramatically different. Direct and indirect tax-
over agriculture,  as well as  to textiles,  serv-  ation  of  domestic  agricultural  production  and
ices,  intellectual  property,  and  "gray  area"  exports  has  hindered  growth  of the  sector.
measures  such  as  voluntary  export  con-  Over-valued  exchange  rates and protection  of
straints,  offers  the  possibility  of  directing  domestic  manufacturing, which has turned the
more of the benefits of liberalized world trade  internal terms of trade away from agriculture,
to developing countries. As such, it is the most  and food  subsidies and price  controls in urban
important  and  ambitious  of the  negotiating  areas  have contributed  to the depressed state
rounds and will play a large role in determin-  of  agriculture  in  developing  countries.  While
ing the growth and prosperity  of developing  industrial countries, by way of agriculture sub-
economies  for decades.  sidies that exceed US $100 billion per year, are
awash  in  surpluses,  developing  country  im-
THE WORLD  AGRICULTURAL  ports  continue  to  grow,  irrigation  systems
POLICY DILEMMA  deteriorate,  agro-industry  largely  stands  in
The  state  of  agriculture  and  the  policies  ruin,  and  export  earnings  from  agriculture
directed  at  the  sector  are  dramatically  dif-  stagnate.  Meanwhile,  rural-to-urban migration
ferent  between  industrial  and  developing  accelerates  and  hunger  persists both in  cities
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59and in the countryside. The state of agriculture  many  net  importing  developing  countries
in developing  countries along with an external  could be potentially  much higher.
debt that is projected to exceed $1.25 trillion in  To  fully  value  the  importance  of  the
1988 threatens the viability of developing coun-  Uruguay  Round,  however,  it is  necessary to
tries and the world economy.  The relocation of  compare  the gains  from liberalized  trade  not
agricultural  production  from  developing  to  just to the current state of agricultural protec-
developed countries through extensive govern-  tion  but  to the  possible  outcome  of a  failed
ment  intervention  has benefitted the farmers  negotiating  round.
and rural economies  of industrial countries but  If the Uruguay  Round fails, it is likely that
at the cost  of large losses  of income  and  em-  many of the industrial countries would either
ployment  in  poorer  countries.  The  Uruguay  seek  autarky  in  agriculture  or  enter  into
Round  negotiations  in  agriculture,  tropical  bilateral  deals that would most likely include
products,  and  textiles  are  fundamental  to  production  controls  and  world-wide  dividing
reversing  this process  and thus have  implica-  of market  shares.  Most  developing countries
tions  well  beyond  the  problems  of excessive  would have little to offer  in bilateral  negotia-
stocks and large budgetary  costs in industrial  tions and would most likely be  effectively ex-
countries.  eluded from the negotiating process. Although
some  countries-because  of strategic  or  col-
THE POTENTIAL  GAINS AND LOSSES  onial ties-might gain from preferential treat-
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  ment, most would not. Even for those that did
gain preferences,  these  concessions  would be
Many  attempts  have been  made  to  model  precarious,  subject  to  withdrawal  at the  in-
the  consequences  of  trade  liberalization  in  itiative  of  the  granting  government.  If  the
agriculture.  Estimates from these models pro-  Uruguay  Round  fails,  higher  food  prices,  in- Uruguay  Round  fails,  higher  food  prices,  in-
vide  rough  approximations  of  the  potential  stability  in  trade,  political  uncertainty,  and
gains and losses from a successful negotiating  limited market  access  could  characterize  in-
round in agriculture.  For example, the World  terational  agriculture  markets  for  develop-
Bank  estimates  the  efficiency  gains  to  the  ing countries.  Such an outcome would indeed
world economy from removing protection and  be a dismal one.
intervention  in both developing and industrial  When compared to this worst case scenario,
countries to  exceed  U.S.  $40  billion  (in  1980  the gains from participating in the process are
prices).  Roughly  half  these  gains  would  be  thus great  even  for those  countries  that  ap-
realized by developing countries.  pear to lose in  these  comparisons  of current
These  estimates  of worldwide  gains  mask  protective states  to liberalized  trade  in agri-
two important aspects of trade liberalization.  culture. An even more restrictive and govern-
According to the World Bank estimates, if the  ment controlled system of trade in agriculture
liberalization  proceeded  only  in  industrial  would  have  dire  consequences  for  most
countries while government invervention con-  developing  countries.  Developing  countries
tinued in developing countries, the developing  should  then  have  a  strong  impetus  to  par-
countries  as a  whole  would be  net  losers  on  ticipate  and  actively  influence  the  negotia- ticipate  and  actively  influence  the  negotia- the  order  of  U.S.  $12  billion.  Furthermore,  tions  in  the  Uruguay  Round.  While  some
among  developing  countries  themselves,  the  developing  countries  recognize  the  impor-
consequences of trade liberalization would dif-  tance of the agricultural negotiations andhave
fer  substantially,  with  net  food-importing  taken  an  active  role,  mainly  through  the
countries such as those in Africa and parts of  Cas groups, many countries remain on the
Latin America losing and net exporting coun-  sidelines,  viewing  the  negotiations  as essen-
tries such as Argentina gaining. The losses to  tially  being  between  industrial  countries,
some  of  the  developing  countries  are  pri-  primarily those  countries represented by the
marily  a result  of  the  rise  in  primary  com-  European  Community  (EC)  and  the  United
modity prices and their growth of dependence  Stat
on wheat imports in the 1970s and 1980s.  It is
important to note that estimates of the price  T  C 
rises  and losses  to  net  food-importing  coun-  E  CO  NTF
tries  resulting  from  trade  liberalization  are  DVL  IN  UN  I
mitigated by the model's assumption that sup-  Besides the major concern that the negotiat-
ply  controls  such  as  acreage  set  asides  are  ing process would fail or reach an unsatisfac-
removed.  If  supply controls  continue  or  are  tory solution, developing countries have other
expanded  to  other  countries,  the  losses  to  concerns  over  the  outcome  of  even  a  suc-
60cessful  Uruguay  Round.  These  concerns  cerned with how they will finance the adjust-
relate  to:  (1) the  transitional  period  and the  ments that may be required of their economies.
structural adjustments required by a new in-  If  food prices  increase,  some  countries  that
ternational trading environment; (2) the inter-  already have balance  of payment  deficits and
nal  political  sensitivity  with respect  to food  are major food importers would be unable to
security;  (3) loss of preferential treatment;  (4)  meet  their  debt-servicing  requirements  or
the  types  of  interventions  that  potentially  would have to cut back on other necessary im-
would be permitted; (5) the availability of food  ports  such  as  capital  goods.  Furthermore,
aid  and other  foreign  assistance;  and  (6) the  with  public  investment  and  expenditure
possibility  that  industrial  countries  will  im-  budgets  already  restricted  by  the  economic
pose supply  controls either  as  an  interim or  crisis, many developing countries would find it
long-term measure.  Concern has also been ex-  difficult  to respond to the new  opportunities
pressed over the long-run stability of a world  offered by higher and different relative prices
agricultural  system  based  on  more. liberal  for agricultural commodities.
trade.  International  facilities,  however,  do  exist
In the proposals of the Cairns group,  of the  that could ease both the short-term balance of
EC, and of the Japanese, the need to address  payment problems and fund the structural ad-
the concerns of developing countries has been  justment  process.  Besides  their  normal
explicitly  acknowledged  through offering  the  balance of payment lending, the International
possibility  of  special  and  differential  treat-  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  has  various  compen-
ment  for  developing  countries.  However,  as  satory  facilities  including  the  Compensatory
yet this special provision  has not been trans-  Finance Facility and the Enhanced Structural
lated into  specific  actions  or proposals.  Fur-  Adjustment  Facility,  while  the  EC  has  the
thermore,  the  U.S.  proposal  makes  no  offer  Stabex  Scheme.  The  World  Bank  also  has
for special treatment for developing countries.  funds  for  financing  adjustment  processes.
The exact nature of how developing countries  However, the IMF, the Stabex, and the World
will  be  treated  in  the  negotiations  remains  Bank facilities  are  designed  to  handle  more
unspecified and heightens  the uncertainty  of  random  and  isolated  events  and  may be  in-
the negotiations for the developing countries.  sufficiently funded  to compensate  for a more
We  will now address each of these concerns.  global event  having an impact  on many coun-
tries,  as would  be the  case with a major ad-
THE TRANSITION  PERIOD AND  justment  in  world  agriculture.  For example,
THE REQUIRED  STRUCTURAL  World Bank lending for structural adjustment
ADJUSTMENT  has been effectively limited to around 20 per-
The  major  proposals  currently  on  the  cent of its annual commitments or about U.S.
negotiating  table  recognize  that it will  take  $3 billion. This limit has already been reached
many  years  to  fully  liberate  agricultural  by current requirements for supporting struc-
trade. The United States has proposed a ten-  tural  and  sector  adjustments  in  developing
year period  for  the  removal  of all interven-  countries.  To support adjustments of a larger year  period for  the  removal  of all  interven-  scale  would  require  more  resources  beyond
tions  and supports.  The  Cairns and EC  pro-  scale  would  reuire  more  resources  beyond
posals  both  offer  a two-phased  approach,  an  would  eithe  nd  to  ri  countries
immediate  freeze  in  subsidies  and  interven-  wcres  to the  need  to  uts orize  capitl 
tions followed  by other measures  over an un-  cres  to  te  a n  iity  thations  or  schemes  or
specified longer period.  support a new facility that  could finance  the specified longer period.
The developing countries have two concerns  requirements  of the adjustment process.
with respect to the transition.  First, they are
worried about the consequences  of the "emer-  FOOD SECURITY AND
gency"  measures, in particular  if they imply  SELF-SUFFICIENCY  ISSUES
market-sharing  arrangements  which  would  Many politicians have promoted the rhetoric
limit their export possibilities or restrict the  of food security  and  self-sufficiency  for their
availability  of  imports.  Furthermore,  the  countries.  Although  this  rhetoric  could  be
short-term  temporary  measures,  in the  view  directed  at  production  of  an  array  of  food
of  the  developing  countries,  might  become  crops, it is usually directed at self-sufficiency
permanent  measures  if the negotiating  proc-  in a single staple, for example, rice in Asia and
ess drags on or the political  will to negotiate  parts of Africa,  wheat in Africa and parts of
diminishes.  Latin America,  and  maize  in, Mexico.  These
Second,  the  developing  countries  are  con-  commodities have been designated by govern-
61ments  for special  incentives,  either  through  TYPES OF SUPPORT  AND
higher protection or support prices, or special  INTERVENTION  PERMITTED
subsidies on inputs. For these politicians now  The U.S.,  EC  and the Cairns  Group have
to  argue  for  increased  reliance  on  interna-  proposed to use the Producer Subsidy Equiva-
tional  markets  for the  supply of these foods  lent (PSE) as a key measure of support and in-
would be difficult  and unpopular.  Regardless  tervention  for agriculture in the negotiations.
of the argument that supply of these commodi-  As currently defined, the PSE includes an ar-
ties would  become  more  certain  through  re-  ray  of  interventions  from  direct  border
liance  on world markets,  the political impera-  measures  such  as tariffs to research  and  ex-
tive  may  dictate  "special  treatment"  being  tension  and  infrastructure.  Although border
given for supporting these commodities up to  measures  including non-tariff barriers  clearly
some  negotiated  percentage  of  self-  influence  trade  flows,  and  should  be  con-
sufficiency. Such a concession, although reduc-  sidered in the negotiations,  other supports to
ing the market for exporters of these staples,  agriculture such as public expenditures  on in-
would probably not significantly distort inter-  frastructure,  research, and extension are less
national  trade.  Recognizing  that  "sacred  directly  trade-distorting  and  should  remain
cows" exist would be one way that special con-  outside the negotiations.
sideration  could be given to some developing  Developing  countries  would  reject  a  PSE
countries.  measure  that  includes  development  expendi-
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT  tures. For developing countries, expenditures
on research  and extension and on other types
Despite  the  underlying  GATT  principle  of  of public-good  activities  are  part  of the  de-
most-favored-nation,  whereby  all  member  velopment  process.  This  then  is  clearly  an
countries  must  receive  trade  benefits  ven  area  where  special  treatment  could  be
another  country,  a clause  in  the  Agreement  granted to developing  countries.
has  permitted  developed  countries  to  grant
special  preferences  to  developing  countries
through tariff concessions. Currently about 25  FOOD AID
developed  countries give  special preferences
t  d oin c  .'  One  of  the  key  means  of  transferring to developing  countries.
Since these special preferences are selective  assistance  to  developing  countries  has  been Since these special preferences are selective food  aid,  either  through  bilateral  donations and are at the discretion of the granting coun-  fo  a,  ther  through  bilaral  doti
try,  they  can  be  divisive  to  the  unity  of  such as the U.S.  PL480 program orby multi- lateral grants through  the  World Food Pro- developing  countries  and  could be  used  as  a  grat  ough te World  Food  Pro-
means by which countries can be punished by  Although food  ad remains  contrver-
the granting  go  m  for v  s  a  l  sial because of its possible disincentive  effects the granting governments  for  various actual
to  agricultural  production  in  the  recipient or alleged  economic  or political offenses. Fur-  to  aricutura  prouction  in  te  r
thermore, many agricultural commoditiesare  coun,  t  an  important  instrument  of
excluded  from  the  preferences  or  are  re-  development  assistance,  one  which  many excluded  from  the  preferences.  or  are  re-  developing countries want continued. Several stricted  by  non-tariff  barriers,  thus  limiting  developing countries want continued.  Severa
their usefulness.  of the proposals include provisions for humani-
Some  cou  s tt  vw t  noton  tarian  assistance  and the  orderly  disposal  of Some  countries  that view  the  negotiations stocks.  However,  the  U.S. proposal  is  silent myopically  will  place  high  priority  on  main-  stos  oee  te  os  is 
taining  their preferential  treatment.  Others  on the issue of food aid. As government  support to  agriculture  de- currently without preferences will attempt to  As government  support  to aiculture  de- cnines,  surplus  public stocks available for food have  the  coverage  extended  to  their  own
countries.  Commodity  groups  in  developed  aid will diminish or possibly disappear.  Food countries.  Commodity  groups  in  developed aid,  which  historically  has  been  integrated countries  may use the issue  of preference  to  a  w  ed
alating  tariffs,  hereby  pro  with the disposal  of surplus public stocks, will
preserve  "eclaig"arfsbecome  more  dependent  on  the  purchase  of
essed commodities  are levied at a higher rate  prtehed  toc  o  r  purchase  of
than the raw  commodity.  As  a consequence,  privately-held  stocks.  However,  purchase  of than  the  raw commodity.  As  a consequence,
developing  countries  may have  much to lose  private  stocks  could  be  subject  to abuse.  In
from  insisting  on preferential  treatment  and  practice,it  will  be  difficult  to  establish  if
most likely  little  gain  government  purchases  are  meeting  require- most likely little to gain. ments for supplies  for food assistance  or are
constituting  price  or  other types  of support
for  agriculture.  Even  if it were  required  to
62match purchases  and  food  aid donations,  the  would  of course  pay  the  costs.  In  industrial
timing  of purchases  and  deliveries  could  be  countries,  these  costs would  be  only  a small
used to support agriculture.  The potential for  part of total private expenditures,  perhaps  a
abuse, or the possibility of governments erect-  lesser amount than consumers in the EC and
ing  "gray"  area  interventions  under  the  Japan are currently  paying.
auspices  of food assistance,  may require that  This  concern  that  the  negotiations  would
restrictions  be  placed  on  government  pur-  turn to supply controls has in part motivated
chases for food assistance. These restrictions,  net  food-importing  countries  to  attempt  to
combined with generally lower levels of world  form a coalition against these and other possi-
food  stocks,  would  raise  concern  about  the  ble  initiatives-so  far  unsuccessfully.  To
adequacy  and  reliability  of  food  assistance  alleviate this concern, the developed countries
among food deficient developing  cotvtries.  would  have to exclude such  measures  unless
As with assistance to short-term and longer-  they  are  clearly  conservationist  in  nature.
term  structural  adjustment,  developed  coun-  While  the  U.S.  Secretary  of Agriculture  has
tries could establish a special fund for the com-  publicly  come  out  against  supply  controls,
petitive purchase in international  markets of  other major negotiating  groups so far remain
food for  development  assistance.  If the  fund  silent on the issue.
were  administered  by  a  "neutral"  multi-  GLOBAL AGRICULTURE  STABILITY
lateral  agency  such  as  the  World  Food  Pro-
gram or Council, this food assistance  could be  International  prices  for  agricultural  com-
largely  independent  of  national  agricultural  modities  have  always  been  volatile.  Simula-
programs.  tion models indicate that with trade liberaliza-
tion this volatility would be reduced by about
SUPPLY AND  PRODUCTION  ten to  15 percent. Nevertheless,  considerable
SACONTROL  MEASURES  volatility would remain that would foment the
desire  of many  governments  to  buffer  both
Some  of the  discussion associated  with the  consumers  and producers  from price  fluctua-
multilateral trade negotiations has been about  tions.  Although  efforts  to  stabilize  domestic
"bringing  supply into balance with demand."  prices  have  generally  been  costly,  many
If  this  refers  to  allowing  prices  to  be  the  developing  countries  will  nevertheless  want
equilibrating  mechanism  through  free  and  to  continue  with price  stabilization  schemes.
uninhibited  markets,  it  would  be  consistent  This  desire  would  become  even  greater  if
with the objectives of promoting international  unexpectedly  price  volatility  increases  coin-
trade  and providing a better allocation  of the  cidentally  or  as  a  consequence  of the  trade
world's  productive resources.  The concern  of  liberalization.  Although  futures  and  options
the  developing  countries  is  that  it does  not  markets  could  be used  to transfer risk, they
mean  equilibrating  supply  and  demand  would  not  necessarily  reduce  price  fluctua-
through price but through supply controls.  tions.  Futhermore,  the  constraints  on  the
The developing  countries have good reason  movement of capital, as is common in develop-
for  their  concern.  Through  the  acreage  set  ing countries, make futures markets generally
asides  and  conservation  reserve  programs,  infeasible.  However,  until  this  concern  over
the United States could potentially pull 80 mil-  price volatility  and risk management  is satis-
lion  acres,  or  20  percent  of their cultivated  factorily addressed,  it will remain  an impor-
acreage,  out of production.  Furthermore,  the  tant issue for developing countries.
EC has instituted controls  on the production
of dairy products  and is  currently discussing  FINAL THOUGHTS
production  controls  for  cereals.  Controls  on  The  Uruguay  Rounds  of agricultural  trade
production  represent for the industrial  coun-  negotiations  are  important  to  the  well-being
tries  a low-cost  mechanism  of satisfying  the  and growth of both developed  and developing
objective  of income  support  to farmers  with  countries. The Uruguay Round has progressed
minimum budgetary outlays while at the same  well so far, with major proposals having been
time  politically  uniting  environmental  and  placed  on  the  negotiating  table.  While  the
conservation  coalitions  with farmers'  groups.  negotiating  positions  of the  industrial  coun-
If the Cairns group can also be brought along  tries appear to be well prepared, not much at-
into  implementing  supply  control  measures  tention appears to have been given to the con-
through the promise of higher prices, then the  cerns  of the  developing  countries other than
necessary  conditions for  effective  worldwide  the general acceptance  of the need for special
supply control would be achieved. Consumers  dispositions. If the Uruguay  Round hastens to
63resolve the immediate problems of agriculture  term  viability  of  any  agreement  will  be
in  developed  countries,  while  failing  to  ade-  threatened.  With the debt  crisis constraining
quately account for the concerns of and the im-  the  possibility  of  rapid  adjustments  in  the
pact  on  the  developing  countries  of  agri-  economies of many developing countries, such
cultural  trade  liberalization,  then  the  long-  a neglect would have global repercussions.
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